经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|Construction Goods and Auctions

相信许多留学生对数学代考都不陌生,国外许多大学都引进了网课的学习模式。网课学业有利有弊,学生不需要到固定的教室学习,只需要登录相应的网站研讨线上课程即可。但也正是其便利性,线上课程的数量往往比正常课程多得多。留学生课业深重,时刻名贵,既要学习知识,又要结束多种类型的课堂作业,physics作业代写,物理代写,论文写作等;网课考试很大程度增加了他们的负担。所以,您要是有这方面的困扰,不要犹疑,订购myassignments-help代考渠道的数学代考服务,价格合理,给你前所未有的学习体会。

我们的数学代考服务适用于那些对课程结束没有掌握,或许没有满足的时刻结束网课的同学。高度匹配专业科目,按需结束您的网课考试、数学代写需求。担保买卖支持,100%退款保证,免费赠送Turnitin检测报告。myassignments-help的Math作业代写服务,是你留学路上忠实可靠的小帮手!


经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|Construction Goods and Auctions

Construction goods are very different from exchange goods. They are fabricated after signing a contract, and they are most often single units and of considerable complexity. This implies three major problems for estimating construction projects: (i) There is no repetitive production of the same good and thus no direct learning about pricing. When someone produces a million pencils, it is of little importance whether the initial price is correct, it can be adjusted within short time. In single-unit production the initial price cannot be changed because the contract is signed and binding before production starts. (ii) The inherent complexity of many construction projects makes it hard to consider and judge all relevant facts. (iii) There is no control over the production conditions; productivity is influenced by the environment as well as by the required contributions of the owner. As construction is a highly integrative process, owners are an important external factor of production. They must know what is required of them (process evidence). Thus, productivity depends not only on the contactor but also on the owner (Brockmann 2011). A more radical view is that of the owner as employer and the contactor as external factor.

Milgrom (1989, Nobel Prize winner 2020) discusses two premises in conjunction with pricing of complex contract goods: the private and the common values assumption. The private values assumption states that contractors can determine their cost correctly (labor, materials, equipment, subcontractors, indirect cost) and Milgrom argues that this assumption does not hold in construction. He assumes estimating errors by all bidders $\left(\varepsilon_{\mathrm{i}}\right)$ with a normal distribution about the mean (i.e. no bias). Detailed analyses of single estimates and the bid-spread of submissions support the statement. The estimating approach takes this into consideration and deals with the problem by detailing a structure into an extensive work breakdown schedule. Judgment mistakes occur for most items; however, they are not systematic (unbiased). Over a large number of items, they cancel each other out, and there is a tendency toward a mean value. In an example of a post-construction analysis of a construction project, the differences in single items reached almost $300 \%$ (planned vs. actual) while the overall difference was only $3 \%$. The contractor was lucky in this case; he had overestimated the total cost (Birol 2009).

The second assumption is accepted by Milgrom for construction projects: All companies face approximately the same cost $(C)$; the common values assumption holds. In different segments of the market, companies of equal size tend to compete against each other, therefore the purchasing power of the companies is the same. Short-term advantages of one competitor (e.g., use of cheap foreign labor) must be imitated by the others due to the competitiveness of the market. Another argument goes as follows: Since all contractors use the same subcontractors and many works are executed by subcontractors, construction prices can vary only due to the efficiency of the management processes (Drew 2011). This argument might be true in some countries, in others it is not. It is possible to define countries with a trading orientation (many Asian countries) and those with a crafts orientation (e.g., Germany). The value of subcontracting as percentage of the total production value has never exceeded $32 \%$ over the past 30 years in Germany. Yet, subcontracting also contributes in such a case to the tendency toward a common value.

经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|Auction Designs

There are a number of different auction designs (Leitzinger 1988). The first question is whether someone wants to sell or to buy a good using an auction design. Sotheby’s typically sells goods but owners buy goods and services. A second distinction is whether the buyer or the seller controls the auction. A third one is whether the bidding process is open or sealed. Drew (2011) makes the following statement: “Sealed bidding is the conventional mechanism used in the construction industry for allocating construction work to willing contractors.”

Therefore, I will concentrate my analysis on sealed-bid auctions. A short description of other types of auctions allows us to evaluate the outcome of sealed-bid auctions. The other auction designs can serve as points of reference.

Selling auctions are the best-known examples of all auction designs, as we can sometimes follow one in movies or on the news, such as the auctioning of a painting by Van Gogh. Four principal options are shown in Figure 15.10. If an auctioneer (seller) controls the auction, he will set the starting price and the price increases. If the buyers control the auction, then they will determine at least the bid changes. Important selling auctions are the Dutch and the English auction.

The auctioneer in a Dutch auction starts with a high price and gradually lowers this price until the first interested bidder agrees to the demanded price. Thus, the highest bidder wins and pays exactly his bid price in this descending bid auction. If all bidders know their private values of the good on offer, the bidder with the highest private value will obtain the good at approximately this price. Differences to the exact private value are due to the steps by which the price is reduced. If, for example, the second-last price was $\$ 1,000$ and the next offer comes at $\$ 950$, a bidder with a private value of $\$ 990$ will have a gain of $\$ 40$.

In an English auction, the auctioneer starts at a low price and slowly increases the price. Each bidder knows his private value. Once the price exceeds this private value, this bidder will drop out of the auction and cannot enter it again. The winning bidder in this ascending price auction will be the one with the highest private value and will have to pay a price close to this, depending on the steps by which the price increases.

It is also possible that bidders determine the price increases or decreases. The winning high bid will again be close to the highest private value, maybe a bit closer because the bidder can choose very small increments.

Designs similar to Dutch and English auctions can also be used for buying goods and services. To differentiate buying and selling situations, these designs are called licitations when buying as the auctioneer wants to elicit the lowest price. Most common in buying situations are sealed-bid auctions; award can go to the winning bidder at the lowest (firstprice) or second lowest price (second-price). Figure 15.11 shows the different options.
In a Dutch licitation, the auctioneer is in a position of a monopsonist and will lower the price until no bidder is willing to offer a lower bid. Award is made to the lowest bid price. This should be close to the bidder with the lowest private value. In construction, this would be the contractor with the lowest estimate. Licitations were at least in Germany used in construction many years ago. The contractors asked to change the practice because they felt that they sometimes got carried away by the emotions similar to gamblers.

微观经济学代考

经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|Construction Goods and Auctions

建筑商品与交换商品有很大不同。它们是在签订合同后制造的,它们通常是单个单元并且相当复杂。这意味着估算建设项目存在三个主要问题:(i) 没有重复生产相同的商品,因此无法直接了解定价。当有人生产一百万支铅笔时,初始价格是否正确并不重要,可以在短时间内进行调整。在单件生产中,初始价格不能更改,因为合同是在生产开始前签署并具有约束力的。(ii) 许多建设项目固有的复杂性使得难以考虑和判断所有相关事实。(iii) 无法控制生产条件;生产力受环境以及所有者所需贡献的影响。由于施工是一个高度综合的过程,业主是重要的外部生产要素。他们必须知道他们需要什么(过程证据)。因此,生产力不仅取决于承包商,还取决于所有者 (Brockmann 2011)。更激进的观点是,业主是雇主,承包商是外部因素。

Milgrom(1989 年,2020 年诺贝尔奖获得者)结合复杂合同商品的定价讨论了两个前提:私人和共同价值假设。私人价值假设表明承包商可以正确地确定他们的成本(劳动力、材料、设备、分包商、间接成本),Milgrom 认为这个假设在建筑中不成立。他假设所有投标人的估计错误(电子我)均值呈正态分布(即无偏差)。对单一估计的详细分析和提交的投标价差支持该声明。估算方法考虑了这一点,并通过将结构详细化为广泛的工作分解计划来处理问题。大多数项目出现判断错误;但是,它们不是系统的(无偏见的)。在大量项目上,它们相互抵消,并且有趋向于均值的趋势。以某建设项目的施工后分析为例,单项差异几乎达到300%(计划与实际)而总体差异仅为3%. 在这种情况下,承包商很幸运;他高估了总成本(Birol 2009)。

Milgrom 接受建设项目的第二个假设:所有公司面临大致相同的成本(C); 共同价值观假设成立。在市场的不同部分,同等规模的公司倾向于相互竞争,因此公司的购买力是相同的。由于市场竞争,一个竞争者的短期优势(例如,使用廉价的外国劳动力)必须被其他竞争者模仿。另一个论点如下:由于所有承包商都使用相同的分包商,并且许多工程由分包商执行,因此建筑价格可能仅因管理流程的效率而异(Drew 2011)。这种说法在某些国家可能是正确的,但在其他国家则不然。可以定义以贸易为导向的国家(许多亚洲国家)和以手工艺为导向的国家(例如德国)。32%在过去的 30 年里,德国。然而,在这种情况下,分包也有助于形成共同价值的趋势。

经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|Auction Designs

有许多不同的拍卖设计(Leitzinger 1988)。第一个问题是某人是否想使用拍卖设计出售或购买商品。苏富比通常出售商品,但所有者购买商品和服务。第二个区别是买家还是卖家控制拍卖。第三个是招标过程是公开的还是密封的。Drew(2011 年)做出以下陈述:“密封投标是建筑行业用于将建筑工作分配给有意愿的承包商的传统机制。”

因此,我将集中分析密封投标拍卖。对其他类型拍卖的简短描述使我们能够评估密封投标拍卖的结果。其他拍卖设计可以作为参考。

出售拍卖是所有拍卖设计中最著名的例子,因为我们有时可以在电影或新闻中看到一个例子,例如梵高的一幅画的拍卖。图 15.10 显示了四个主要选项。如果拍卖师(卖家)控制拍卖,他将设定起拍价和价格上涨。如果买家控制了拍卖,那么他们至少会决定出价的变化。重要的拍卖是荷兰式和英国式拍卖。

荷兰式拍卖中的拍卖师以高价开始并逐渐降低该价格,直到第一个感兴趣的投标人同意要求的价格。因此,出价最高者获胜,并在降价拍卖中准确支付他的出价。如果所有投标人都知道他们对所提供商品的私人价值,则具有最高私人价值的投标人将以大约这个价格获得商品。与确切私人价值的差异是由于价格降低的步骤。例如,如果倒数第二个价格是$1,000下一个报价是在$950,一个私人价值为$990将获得$40.

在英式拍卖中,拍卖师以低价开始,然后慢慢提高价格。每个投标人都知道自己的私人价值。一旦价格超过这个私有值,该竞拍者将退出竞拍,不能再次进入竞拍。在这种升价拍卖中,中标者将是私人价值最高的人,并且必须支付接近此的价格,具体取决于价格上涨的幅度。

投标人也有可能决定价格的上涨或下跌。中标的高价将再次接近最高私人价值,可能更接近一点,因为投标人可以选择非常小的增量。

类似于荷兰语和英语拍卖的设计也可用于购买商品和服务。为了区分买卖情况,这些设计在购买时被称为 licitations,因为拍卖师希望获得最低价格。在购买情况下最常见的是密封投标拍卖;奖励可以以最低(第一价格)或第二最低价格(第二价格)授予中标者。图 15.11 显示了不同的选项。
在荷兰式拍卖中,拍卖师处于垄断者的地位,会降低价格,直到没有投标人愿意提供更低的出价。授予最低的投标价格。这应该接近私人价值最低的投标人。在建筑中,这将是估价最低的承包商。许多年前至少在德国的建筑中使用了许可证。承包商要求改变做法,因为他们觉得自己有时会像赌徒一样被情绪冲昏头脑。

经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考

myassignments-help数学代考价格说明

1、客户需提供物理代考的网址,相关账户,以及课程名称,Textbook等相关资料~客服会根据作业数量和持续时间给您定价~使收费透明,让您清楚的知道您的钱花在什么地方。

2、数学代写一般每篇报价约为600—1000rmb,费用根据持续时间、周作业量、成绩要求有所浮动(持续时间越长约便宜、周作业量越多约贵、成绩要求越高越贵),报价后价格觉得合适,可以先付一周的款,我们帮你试做,满意后再继续,遇到Fail全额退款。

3、myassignments-help公司所有MATH作业代写服务支持付半款,全款,周付款,周付款一方面方便大家查阅自己的分数,一方面也方便大家资金周转,注意:每周固定周一时先预付下周的定金,不付定金不予继续做。物理代写一次性付清打9.5折。

Math作业代写、数学代写常见问题

留学生代写覆盖学科?

代写学科覆盖Math数学,经济代写,金融,计算机,生物信息,统计Statistics,Financial Engineering,Mathematical Finance,Quantitative Finance,Management Information Systems,Business Analytics,Data Science等。代写编程语言包括Python代写、Physics作业代写、物理代写、R语言代写、R代写、Matlab代写、C++代做、Java代做等。

数学作业代写会暴露客户的私密信息吗?

我们myassignments-help为了客户的信息泄露,采用的软件都是专业的防追踪的软件,保证安全隐私,绝对保密。您在我们平台订购的任何网课服务以及相关收费标准,都是公开透明,不存在任何针对性收费及差异化服务,我们随时欢迎选购的留学生朋友监督我们的服务,提出Math作业代写、数学代写修改建议。我们保障每一位客户的隐私安全。

留学生代写提供什么服务?

我们提供英语国家如美国、加拿大、英国、澳洲、新西兰、新加坡等华人留学生论文作业代写、物理代写、essay润色精修、课业辅导及网课代修代写、Quiz,Exam协助、期刊论文发表等学术服务,myassignments-help拥有的专业Math作业代写写手皆是精英学识修为精湛;实战经验丰富的学哥学姐!为你解决一切学术烦恼!

物理代考靠谱吗?

靠谱的数学代考听起来简单,但实际上不好甄别。我们能做到的靠谱,是把客户的网课当成自己的网课;把客户的作业当成自己的作业;并将这样的理念传达到全职写手和freelancer的日常培养中,坚决辞退糊弄、不守时、抄袭的写手!这就是我们要做的靠谱!

数学代考下单流程

提早与客服交流,处理你心中的顾虑。操作下单,上传你的数学代考/论文代写要求。专家结束论文,准时交给,在此过程中可与专家随时交流。后续互动批改

付款操作:我们数学代考服务正常多种支付方法,包含paypal,visa,mastercard,支付宝,union pay。下单后与专家直接互动。

售后服务:论文结束后保证完美经过turnitin查看,在线客服全天候在线为您服务。如果你觉得有需求批改的当地能够免费批改,直至您对论文满意为止。如果上交给教师后有需求批改的当地,只需求告诉您的批改要求或教师的comments,专家会据此批改。

保密服务:不需求提供真实的数学代考名字和电话号码,请提供其他牢靠的联系方法。我们有自己的工作准则,不会泄露您的个人信息。

myassignments-help擅长领域包含但不是全部:

myassignments-help服务请添加我们官网的客服或者微信/QQ,我们的服务覆盖:Assignment代写、Business商科代写、CS代考、Economics经济学代写、Essay代写、Finance金融代写、Math数学代写、report代写、R语言代考、Statistics统计学代写、物理代考、作业代写、加拿大代考、加拿大统计代写、北美代写、北美作业代写、北美统计代考、商科Essay代写、商科代考、数学代考、数学代写、数学作业代写、physics作业代写、物理代写、数据分析代写、新西兰代写、澳洲Essay代写、澳洲代写、澳洲作业代写、澳洲统计代写、澳洲金融代写、留学生课业指导、经济代写、统计代写、统计作业代写、美国Essay代写、美国代考、美国数学代写、美国统计代写、英国Essay代写、英国代考、英国作业代写、英国数学代写、英国统计代写、英国金融代写、论文代写、金融代考、金融作业代写。

发表评论

您的电子邮箱地址不会被公开。 必填项已用*标注

Scroll to Top