经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|ECON2516

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经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|Second-Degree Price Discrimination

One central problem a monopolist faces when trying to discriminate prices is his lack of information about customers. There are two ways to solve this problem: investing in better information or using the given information to discriminate prices with maximum possible effectiveness. This subchapter will analyze the latter strategy.

In order to keep the problem simple and manageable, assume that there are two groups of customers, which can be differentiated by their willingness to pay. The firm knows each group’s willingness to pay and also the respective group sizes, but cannot identify a customer as a member of one group or the other. An example for this situation is an airline that offers a flight from Zurich to Frankfurt, which is frequented by both business and leisure travelers. Business travelers have a higher willingness to pay for the flight and, in particular, for altering bookings flexibly. The airline knows the respective willingness to pay, as well as the groups’ relative sizes, but cannot distinguish between individuals at the ticket counter (or on their homepage for that matter).

If the firm had all the relevant information, it would charge each customer according to his or her willingness to pay, such that both groups would receive their respective optimal offers, as in the case of first-degree price discrimination. From the point of view of the firm, the problem with asymmetric information is that a customer with a high willingness to pay may prefer the offer that is being provided for customers with a low willingness to pay. Their “own” offer gives the customer zero consumer surplus, whereas the offer provided for the other group not only differs in the quantity or quality of the good but is also sold at a different price (both lower). Hence, buying a lower quality or quantity at a lower price might be profitable for the customer, if the lower price compensates for the loss in quality or quantity. In that case, all customers choose the offer that was designed for the group with the lower willingness to pay and the other offer remains a shelf warmer. This observation hegs the question of what a firm’s optimal reaction should be.

In order to answer the question, one should give the problem a more formal structure and analyze it graphically. In the following figures, one can see the quantity or quality of a good along the abscissa and the customers’ willingness to pay along the ordinate. “Quantity” or “quality” can thereby be interpreted as an attribute, for which there are differences in the willingness to pay. In the airline example, quality can be interpreted as the flexibility to alter a booking, how much leg space there is or the level of service provided. If the good is a printer, quantity could refer to the number of pages the printer can print per minute.

经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|First-Degree Price Discrimination

This subchapter covers the problem of a monopolist who is able to discriminate prices perfectly. Although this is not a very realistic assumption, as firms are usually unable to get all the relevant information, it is a useful theoretical benchmark and allows one to better understand the reasons for the above-mentioned inefficiency as well as current trends in firms’ pricing strategies.

Perfect price discrimination is easy to analyze. In order to be able to pursue this strategy, the monopolist needs to know the willingness to pay of each individual customer. If this information is available, the firm will charge individualized prices for each customer, which equal that customer’s willingness to pay. (It may be necessary to lower the price a bit to induce customers to actually buy the product. The remainder of this book will assume that indifferent customers behave in the interest of the firm. This assumption is innocuous with respect to its implications and simplifies the analysis.) Hence, in such a market, there is no uniform price, but a price function that is exactly equal to the inverse-demand function.

What is the minimal price at which the monopolist will supply the good? His profit increases as long as the price of the last unit exceeds the marginal costs of that unit. Hence, he will expand his supply up until the point where price equals marginal costs. This brings about a surprising result: The resulting market equilibrium is Pareto-efficient and the sum of consumer and producer surpluses are maximized. However, contrary to the case of perfect competition, gains from trade are not shared between the producer and the customers. Instead, the monopolist is able to skim off all the surplus in the market (see Fig. 14.3).

What are the consequences of this discovery for economic policy and the regulation of monopoly markets? If one compares the case of a non-price-discriminating monopolist with that of a perfectly price-discriminating one, one can see that the monopolist will always choose to discriminate prices, if he can. Hence, the inefficiency in the market with a non-price-discriminating monopolist is caused by the inability to discriminate prices. There are three reasons why this instrument may be infeasible:

  1. Price discrimination is illegal. The monopolist is then forced to charge the same price for any customer. In this case, it is the regulation of the market that causes the inefficiency. Market failure is not a result of some inherent tendency of the monopolist to be inefficient, but of a failed regulation of the monopoly (if the objective of regulation is to achieve efficiency).
经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|ECON2516

微观经济学代考

经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|Second-Degree Price Discrimination

垄断者在试图实行价格歧视时面临的一个主要问题是他缺乏有关客户的信息。有两种方法可以解决这个问题:投资于更好的信息或使用给定的信息以最大可能的有效性来区分价格。本节将分析后一种策略。

为了使问题简单易行,假设有两组客户,可以通过他们的支付意愿来区分。公司知道每个群体的支付意愿以及各自群体的规模,但无法将客户识别为某个群体的成员。这种情况的一个例子是一家航空公司提供从苏黎世到法兰克福的航班,商务和休闲旅客经常光顾该航班。商务旅客更愿意为航班付费,尤其是更愿意灵活更改预订。航空公司知道各自的支付意愿以及团体的相对规模,但无法在售票柜台(或在他们的主页上)区分个人。

如果公司掌握了所有相关信息,它就会根据每个顾客的支付意愿向他们收费,这样两个群体都会收到各自的最优报价,就像一级价格歧视的情况一样。从公司的角度来看,信息不对称的问题在于,支付意愿高的客户可能更喜欢为支付意愿低的客户提供的报价。他们“自己”的报价给客户零消费者剩余,而为另一组提供的报价不仅在商品的数量或质量上不同,而且以不同的价格出售(均较低)。因此,如果较低的价格弥补了质量或数量的损失,以较低的价格购买较低质量或数量的产品可能对客户有利。在这种情况下,所有顾客都选择为支付意愿较低的群体设计的报价,而另一个报价则保持货架较暖。这一观察结果回避了公司的最佳反应应该是什么的问题。

为了回答这个问题,应该给这个问题一个更正式的结构,并用图形来分析它。在下面的图中,可以看到横坐标是商品的数量或质量,纵坐标是顾客的支付意愿。因此,“数量”或“质量”可以被解释为一种属性,为此支付意愿存在差异。在航空公司的例子中,质量可以解释为更改预订的灵活性、有多少腿部空间或提供的服务水平。如果货物是打印机,数量可以指打印机每分钟可以打印的页数。

经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考|First-Degree Price Discrimination

本章涵盖了能够完美地区分价格的垄断者的问题。虽然这不是一个非常现实的假设,因为企业通常无法获得所有相关信息,但它是一个有用的理论基准,可以让人们更好地理解上述低效率的原因以及企业定价的当前趋势策略。

完全价格歧视很容易分析。为了能够实施这一战略,垄断者需要了解每个客户的支付意愿。如果此信息可用,公司将为每个客户收取个性化价格,这等于该客户的支付意愿。(可能需要稍微降低价格以诱导客户实际购买产品。本书的其余部分将假设冷漠的客户的行为符合公司的利益。这一假设就其含义而言是无害的,并简化了分析。)因此,在这样的市场中,没有统一的价格,而是恰好等于反需求函数的价格函数。

垄断者提供商品的最低价格是多少?只要最后一个单位的价格超过那个单位的边际成本,他的利润就会增加。因此,他将扩大供应直到价格等于边际成本。这带来了一个令人惊讶的结果:由此产生的市场均衡是帕累托有效的,消费者和生产者剩余的总和最大化。然而,与完全竞争的情况相反,贸易收益不会在生产者和消费者之间共享。相反,垄断者能够掠夺市场上的所有剩余(见图 14.3)。

这一发现对经济政策和垄断市场监管有何影响?如果将非价格歧视垄断者的情况与完全价格歧视垄断者的情况进行比较,就会发现垄断者如果可以的话,总是会选择价格歧视。因此,非价格歧视垄断者的市场效率低下是由于无法歧视价格造成的。该工具可能不可行的三个原因:

  1. 价格歧视是非法的。然后,垄断者被迫对任何客户收取相同的价格。在这种情况下,是市场的监管导致了效率低下。市场失灵不是垄断者无效率的某些内在倾向的结果,而是垄断监管失败的结果(如果监管的目标是实现效率)。
经济代写|微观经济学代写Microeconomics代考

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