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经济代写|劳动经济学代写Labor Economics代考|Training and Post-Training Wage Increases
Consider a situation in which worker-mobility costs are relatively low, and the employer is considering bearing all the costs of training. With investment costs to recoup, the employer would be unable to raise wages very much after training and still have incentives to invest. We know that higher wages reduce the probability of a worker quitting, so by failing to increase the wage much after training, the employer would put its investment at risk. Trained workers might decide to quit at even a small provocation (the boss is in a bad mood one day, for example, or they are asked to work overtime for a while), and without some assurance that trained employees will stay, the firm would be reluctant to make a training investment for which it bore all the costs.
Conversely, if a firm’s employees paid for their own training by taking a lower wage than they could get elsewhere during the training period, they would require the benefits of a much higher post-training wage to make employment at the firm attractive. If they were to get all of their improved marginal revenue product in the form of a wage increase, however, an employer that finds it relatively inexpensive to hire and fire workers would have little to lose by firing them at the smallest provocation-and if they get fired, their investment is destroyed!
Thus, if labor market frictions are otherwise small, the best way to provide incentives for on-the-job training is for employers and employees to share the costs and returns of the investment. If employees pay part of these costs, the post-training wage can be increased more than if employers bear all the training costs-and the increased posttraining wage protects firms’ investments by reducing the chances trained workers will quit. The training costs borne by employers must be recouped by not raising the posttraining wage very much, but this condition helps protect workers’ investments by making it attractive for firms to retain them unless the provocation is major (we discuss the issue of layoffs in more detail a bit later in this chapter). Put differently, if both employers and employees share in the costs of training, and thus share in the returns, they both have something to lose if the employment relationship is ended in the posttraining period.
经济代写|劳动经济学代写Labor Economics代考|Employer Training Investments and Recessionary Layoffs
We have seen that employers will have incentives to invest in worker training only when the post-training marginal revenue productivity is expected to be sufficiently above the wage so that the investment returns are attractive. Suppose a firm has made the investment but at some point thereafter finds that its workers’ marginal revenue productivity falls below what it expected because of a business downturn (a “recession”). If it cannot lower wages for one reason or another (we will discuss why wages might be inflexible in a downward direction in chapter 14), will the firm want to lay off its trained workers?
In general, firms will not want to lay off their workers as long as the workers are bringing in revenues that are in excess of their wages. Even if the gap between marginal revenue productivity and wage is not sufficient to yield an attractive return on the firm’s training investment, those training costs- once incurred-are “sunk.” While the firm might wish it had not invested in training, the best it can do after training is get what returns it can. Workers who are laid off clearly bring in no returns to the employer, so its incentives are to retain any worker whose marginal revenue productivity exceeds his or her wage. Of course, if the downturn causes marginal revenue productivity to still fall below the wage rate, firms do have incentives to lay off trained workers (unless they believe the downturn will be very short and do not want to take the risk that the laid-off workers will search for other employment).
The presence of employer training investments, then, offers an explanation for two phenomena we observe in the labor market. First, as a general rule, we observe that workers who are least susceptible to being laid off during recessions are the most skilled and those with the longest job tenures. ${ }^{26}$ Older and more skilled workers are those most likely to have been the objects of past employer training investments, and they therefore tend to enter recessions with larger gaps between marginal revenue product and wage. These gaps cushion any fall in marginal revenue product and provide their employers with stronger incentives to keep on employing them during the downturn. Workers who enter the recession with wages closer to marginal revenue productivity are more likely to find that the downturn causes their marginal revenue product to fall below their wage, and when this occurs, employers may find it profitable to lay them off.
Second, we observe that average labor productivity-output per labor hour-falls in the early stages of a recession and rises during the early stages of recovery. As demand and output start to fall, firms that have invested in worker training respond by keeping their trained workers on the payroll even though their marginal productivity falls. Such “labor hoarding” causes output per worker to fall. Of course, when demand picks up again, firms can increase output without proportionately increasing their employment because, in effect, they have maintained an inventory of trained labor. In the latter situation, output per worker rises.
经济代写|劳动经济学代写劳动经济学代考|培训和培训后工资增长
考虑这样一种情况，工人的流动成本相对较低，雇主正考虑承担所有的培训成本。由于要收回投资成本，雇主将无法在培训后大幅提高工资，同时仍有投资动机。我们知道，较高的工资降低了工人辞职的可能性，因此，如果在培训后不大幅提高工资，雇主将把投资置于风险之中。受过培训的员工可能会因为一个小小的挑衅就决定辞职(例如，老板有一天心情不好，或者他们被要求加班一段时间)，如果不能保证受过培训的员工会留下来，公司就不愿意进行培训投资，因为它承担了所有的成本
相反，如果一家公司的员工在培训期间拿的工资比在其他地方拿的低，那么他们就需要培训后获得更高的工资，以使公司的就业更具吸引力。然而，如果他们通过提高工资的形式获得所有提高的边际收入产品，那么发现雇佣和解雇工人相对便宜的雇主在最轻微的挑衅下解雇他们就不会有什么损失——如果他们被解雇了，他们的投资就毁了!
因此，如果劳动力市场摩擦在其他方面很小，为在职培训提供激励的最好方法是让雇主和雇员共同分担投资的成本和回报。如果员工支付部分成本，培训后的工资就会比雇主承担所有培训成本增加更多——培训后增加的工资通过减少受过培训的员工辞职的机会来保护公司的投资。雇主承担的培训成本必须通过不大幅提高培训后的工资来补偿，但这种条件有助于保护工人的投资，因为它使公司有吸引力留住他们，除非挑衅是重大的(我们将在本章后面稍微详细讨论裁员问题)。换句话说，如果雇主和雇员都分担培训的成本，并因此分享回报，如果雇佣关系在培训后结束，他们双方都有损失
经济代写|劳动经济学代写劳动经济学代考|雇主培训、投资和衰退裁员
我们已经看到，只有当培训后的边际收入生产率被预期足以高于工资，从而使投资回报具有吸引力时，雇主才会有动机投资于工人培训。假设一家公司进行了投资，但在此后的某个时刻发现，由于业务低迷(“衰退”)，其员工的边际收入生产率低于预期。如果它不能因为这样或那样的原因降低工资(我们将在第14章讨论为什么工资在向下的方向可能是不灵活的)，公司会解雇它的训练有素的工人吗?
一般来说，只要工人带来的收入超过他们的工资，公司就不愿意解雇工人。即使边际收入、生产率和工资之间的差距不足以为公司的培训投资带来有吸引力的回报，这些培训成本——一旦发生——就被“沉没”了。尽管该公司可能希望自己没有在培训上投资，但在培训之后，它能做的最好的事情就是尽可能地获得回报。被解雇的工人显然不会给雇主带来任何回报，因此它的动机是留住任何边际收入生产率超过其工资的工人。当然，如果经济衰退导致边际收入生产率仍然低于工资率，公司确实有解雇受过培训的工人的动机(除非他们认为经济衰退将是非常短暂的，不想冒被解雇的工人会寻找其他工作的风险)
那么，雇主培训投资的存在为我们在劳动力市场观察到的两个现象提供了解释。首先，作为一般规则，我们观察到，在经济衰退期间最不容易被解雇的工人是技术最熟练和工作年限最长的人。${ }^{26}$年龄较大和技术更熟练的工人最有可能成为过去雇主培训投资的对象，因此，他们在进入衰退时，边际收入产品和工资之间的差距更大。这些差距缓冲了边际收入产品的任何下降，并为他们的雇主提供了更强的动机，在经济低迷期间继续雇用他们。进入衰退时，工资接近边际收入生产率的工人更有可能发现，经济衰退导致他们的边际收入产品低于工资，当这种情况发生时，雇主可能会发现解雇他们是有利可图的
第二，我们观察到平均劳动生产率——每工时产出——在衰退的早期阶段下降，在复苏的早期阶段上升。当需求和产出开始下降时，那些投资于工人培训的公司做出了回应，即使他们的边际生产率下降，他们也会继续雇佣受过培训的工人。这种“劳动力囤积”导致每个工人的产量下降。当然，当需求再次回升时，企业可以在不按比例增加就业的情况下增加产量，因为实际上，它们保持了受过培训的劳动力的库存。在后一种情况下，每个工人的产出增加
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